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INTRODUCTION 
Terrorists' acts do not normally cause a business to 
close down operations, although that can happen. But 
terrorism does contribute to the economic factors that 
may in fact create the climate for such a decision. As 
terrorism contributes to a deteriorating economic, 
political and psychological situation, it influences basic 
investmant decisions in a very negative manner . . . . 
Consequently, the company suffers, the affected coun-
try suffers even more and the . . . national interest suf-
fers.1 
During the worst period of terrorist violence in Argentina in the 
1970s, the disinvestment and departure of multinational corporations 
(MNCs), especially North American firms such as ITT, IBM, Coca-
Cola, John Deere, Otis Elevator, and Alcan, were directly attributable to 
the prevalent terrorist tactic of expatriate executive kidnapping.2 Radical 
displacements of this nature disrupt coordination of operational 
management tasks, have an impact upon productivity, and create 
substantial problems in tactical decision making. Many parallels are be-
ing drawn in the counter-terrorism and intelligence communities and the 
security industry between the situation then and current conditions in 
Colombia, where the agenda of declared assassination targets for ter-
rorist groups features expatriate and domestic businessmen, as well as 
police and government officials. 
Assassinations of businessmen and other violent acts attract media 
attention and are difficult to cover up. These events demand action of 
some sort—or the appearance of action—from the host country govern-
ment and have a prolonged impact on operations in the host country and 
its geographic area. As a tactic against soft targets, which include 
multinational corporations, terrorism achieves large effects at minimum 
cost to perpetrators. Since mortality during an incident and non-lethal 
casualties are accorded attention in the media far in excess of their 
statistical importance, the detonation of one bomb at the offices or in the 
production facilities of a corporation, the kidnapping of one executive, 
or an ambush and attack upon an executive, can initiate a reactive chain 
of corporate security measures. It will not only introduce a climate of 
fear and apprehension throughout an MNCs overseas operations, but 
that sense of anxiety and trepidation will permeate the organization, ex-
tending to its headquarters thousands of miles away. 
The aggregate number of attacks on multinational business and 
those involving death or injury in comparison to the number of corporate 
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overseas operations is in itself not large. In relation to the number of 
vehicular deaths in Canada in any year or the annual homicide rate of a 
major U.S. city it is not substantial. However, the incidents impart a 
disproportionately high impact on business. Shock tactics, such as the 
assassination of an executive, are met with a "gut reaction" and it is 
possible through these measures to drive foreign executives and their 
companies from a country.3 
A brief review of the statistics on terrorist incidents, particularly 
those against business, is in order. There are at least eight organizations 
keeping terrorism databases. Because of the disparity in coding pro-
cedures between and among official agencies—such as CIA and State 
Department—and International Terrorist Research Center, Risks Inter-
national, Intertel and other private firms, only two sources are used here 
for benchmark data." 
In the five-year time-frame from 1983—the year of the terrorist 
truckbomb attack on U.S. Marine Headquarters at Beirut Air-
port—through year-end 1987, annual terrorist incidents, according to of-
ficial figures, rose from 485 to 832 (831 plus one attack that occurred in 
international waters). Business Risks International (BRI), using coding 
criteria substantially different from State Department and other U.S. 
government agencies, reports a total of 3089 terrorist incidents in 1987 
(2860 in 1986), with 1868 of them taking place in Latin America. U.S. 
government figures reflect 108 of 831 incidents as having occurred in 
Latin America, while 370 transpired in the Middle East. BRI puts 211 in-
cidents in the Middle East/North Africa of their 3089 incident total.' 
Casualty figures from official sources reflect an increase in dead and 
wounded from 1904 in 1983 (883 in 1982) to 2905 in 1987. The 81% 
escalation in wounded for the five years, and an extraordinary 368% rise 
in Asian incident figures, 1987 over 1983, are attributable to 1987 ter-
rorist bombings in Pakistan, of which 128 are believed to be linked to the 
Afghan secret police. They caused 1298 casualties (1076 wounded and 
222 killed). Assassination continues to grow as an instrument of 
choice—374 in 1985, 399 in 1986, and 426 in 1987.6 
State Department indicates 150 arson incidents in 1987, while there 
were 47 in 1983. Explosive bombings officially reported totaled 473 in 
1987 (as against 254 in 1983) out of the year's aggregate incidents. (Inci-
dent figures may exceed event totals due to overlapping.) Risks Interna-
tional Division of BRI records 1501 bombings in their 3089 total for 1987 
(48.6%). Of that 1501, however, 802, or 53.4%, were directed against 
business.7 
Official records, according to conservative State Department coding 
criteria, specify 204 attacks against business in 1987 (74 in 1983) out of 
the total 832 incidents this last year (485 in 1983). The recent five-year 
time-frame thus reflects a 71.5% increase in incidents but a 175.7% rise 
in business attacks.8 
Perhaps the most telling statistics (occurring in the BRI reporting 
structure) are those relating to "facilities attack." These continued to in-
crease from 879 in 1986 to 1087 in 1987. Facilities attack as a category is 
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characterized as one in which the terrorists are physically present during 
the incident, as opposed to a remote-control or timed detonation of an 
explosive or incendiary device. In some cases, the terrorists intentionally 
remained on the premises and engaged security forces, when they arriv-
ed, in fire fights, inflicting considerable casualties by dint of the ter-
rorists' superior weaponry and firepower. The increase in confidence im-
plied by these figures and anecdotal chronologies of events is especially 
ominous. 
Having described the scope of terrorism in quantitative terms, with 
special reference to MNCs, it is appropriate to set more precise boun-
daries. This will entail a discussion of terrorism as a concept, thus setting 
the stage for an analysis of potential responses to the problem. 
THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM 
"Terrorism" is a term that has generated a great deal of confusion 
in recent years. Misunderstanding is widespread. Sometimes the media 
will treat an act of politically-motivated violence as terrorism, and on 
other occasions perpetrators will be referred to as "guerrillas."' Uncer-
tainty is most apparent in the international community, which has been 
unable to agree upon a definition. This reflects the efforts of states which 
support terrorist movements and seek to legitimize terrorist acts.10 For 
example, terrorism is regarded in some quarters as essential to the strug-
gle for "national liberation" waged by those under "imperialist oppres-
sion." Thus it is important to set the boundaries of an investigation of 
terrorism quite carefully. From this point onward terrorism will be defin-
ed as follows: 
the systematic threat or use of violence by a state or 
non-state actor, with the intention of inspiring fear, in-
fluencing government or corporate policy, undermining 
public confidence, or promoting unrest, as part of a 
plan to impose the perspectives held by the terrorists on 
society. 
This definition has two principal advantages. One is that it eschews 
any reference to guilt or innocence. The other advantage is that the 
definition incorporates state and non-state actors; it is very difficult to 
distinguish these entities in the contemporary world of terrorism. For ex-
ample, if a state supplies dissident foreign nationals with intelligence, 
weapons and safe houses, are these individuals or groups still indepen-
dent agents, that is, non-state actors, or should they be regarded as ex-
tensions of the state? In either case their activities are appropriate subject 
matter for an investigation of terrorism. 
Some believe that the problem posed by terrorism has been greatly 
exaggerated, mostly due to the media." It is not difficult to see why this 
belief has emerged. In a given year, the citizen of a Western country is far 
more likely to die in an automobile accident than in a terrorist attack, 
and airline passengers are much more likely to die in a plane crash 
resulting from human error or equipment failure than because of a hi-
jacking. Why, then, the great concern with terrorism? 
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There are several reasons why the mere statistical scarcity of events 
cannot fully convey the dangers posed by international terrorism. One is 
that its impact is not a direct function of frequency. While the chance of 
a skyjacking for a given flight in North America is about 1 in 100,000,12 
in 1986 the vacation plans of a great many Canadians changed because of 
the perceived danger of traveling to Europe. A few highly publicized 
events can have the effect intended by the terrorists: creation of a climate 
of fear. 
A related problem is the potential of terrorism to damage the 
modern, interdependent world economy. While the basic motive of ter-
rorism—the use of violence to achieve political ends—has not changed, 
the tactics are more menacing than ever. Submachine guns and 
lightweight, high-powered plastic explosives have facilitated killing, and 
the range of potential victims also has increased. Terrorists, who might 
once have showed concern that no bystanders be injured or killed, have 
made it clear through their actions that everyone and everything is a 
possible target. 
Private citizens, such as corporate employees, are especially 
vulnerable under the current modus operandi. MNCs are perceived by 
terrorists to be mere extensions of their nominal "home" countries. This 
is not in line with the self-perception of MNCs as transnational, 
economic actors. The adversaries view the struggle in very different 
terms as a result. MNCs regard terrorism as a business risk to be insured 
against; terrorists see MNCs as the global representatives of states with 
unwanted (that is, capitalist) ideologies. Consequently, terrorist groups 
increasingly have engaged in "networking," while the collective 
responses by MNCs and governments have not been impressive to date. 
Terrorist networking indeed may be the most significant change 
over the past few decades. The establishment of links among the many 
terrorist organizations around the globe constitutes a system of mutual 
aid used to transmit money, documentation, weapons and training.13 
The factor which has contributed the most to networking has been the 
aid provided by certain governments. War is more expensive and risky 
than ever; many states have come to regard terrorism as quite an inex-
pensive and virtually risk-free alternative method of destabilizing 
enemies.14 In an undeclared war by proxy against the West, the USSR 
(and many of its affiliated states), South Yemen, North Korea, Libya, 
Syria, Iran and Iraq, among others, provide terrorist allies with support. 
This assistance includes training, money, weapons, transportation, safe 
houses and refuge. In most instances these states do not control or direct 
international terrorism but they assist it quite effectively.15 Without such 
aid, it is unlikely that terrorism could have attained its present scale. 
Hence, terrorism as a concept should be understood broadly. It is a 
global political phenomenon involving transnational actors and 
recognized governments. As will become apparent, responses to interna-
tional terrorism have not demonstrated a thorough grasp of its essential 
characteristics. 
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DEALING WITH TERRORISM 
Contemporary terrorism adversely affects individual states, the 
community of states, and MNCs. All of these targets also may be regard-
ed as potential sources of counter-terrorist measures. It is beyond the 
scope of this article to deal thoroughly with even a fraction of the many 
responses that have been advocated for each of these interested parties. 
However, a survey of a few of the most commonly proposed policy op-
tions will support an underlying theme: MNCs should reconsider their 
options. These range from passive and active defense through reactive 
measures to proactive policy. It is hypothesized that MNCs will increas-
ingly turn to proactive policies, that is, seizure of the initiative, because 
they will be driven by circumstances to view them as appropriate.'6 Pro-
active policies may involve questions of subversion of sovereignty in host 
countries as well as conflict with home country foreign policy 
prerogatives and defined interests. This aspect will be dealt with in a 
pragmatic context later in the discussion. In summarizing state-level per-
formance, it will become apparent that MNCs cannot expect effective 
responses to terrorism from either individual states or collectivities of 
states. 
No effort will be made to cover exhaustively the strategies and tac-
tics that might be pursued by states or aggregates of states. Instead, a few 
examples will be used to illustrate an important common trait among all 
such responses. More specifically, initiatives by individual states or 
groups of states directed against terrorism will be inhibited by the logic 
of collective action. Although Olson summarized the paradox of group 
rationality in a discussion of profit-maximizing firms, the analysis also is 
relevant to the behavior expected from self-interested governments: 
Just as it was not rational for a particular producer to 
restrict his output in order that there might be a higher 
price for the product of his industry, so it would not be 
rational for him to sacrifice his time and money to sup-
port a lobbying organization to obtain government 
assistance for the industry. In neither case would it be in 
the interest of the individual producer to assume any of 
the costs himself." 
Since the benefits from combating terrorism are distributed 
generally—given the transnational nature of the problem—the situation 
faced by the Western states parallels that of Olson's firms. All of the 
states would like to see a reduced level of international terrorism. 
However, there is an incentive to avoid the costs of contributing to the 
collective good while simultaneously reaping the benefits. Because each 
state follows a similar line of reasoning, a suboptimal degree of collective 
action against terrorism may be expected from the relatively large 
number of states concerned with the problem. Since there is no specific 
state with a sufficient preponderance of MNCs to provide the collective 
good on its own, terrorism continues largely unchecked by 
governments." 
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Given constraints of space, only a few methods for dealing with ter-
rorism will be discussed. At the state-level, control over media coverage 
will be appraised. Cooperation among states will be evaluated in terms of 
basic measures such as the exchange of information. Finally, the options 
available to MNCs will be considered in light of the likely future profile 
of state-level action against terrorism. 
Governments, scholars and some people within the industry itself 
have criticized the media for irresponsible reporting and unrealistic por-
trayal of terrorists. It is asserted, and in some cases demonstrated, that 
media coverage of terrorist events: (1) legitimizes terrorism by providing 
the perpetrators with a platform to express their views; (2) leads others to 
take up terrorism; (3) makes future terrorist incidents more difficult to 
resolve by excessively detailing both terrorist and counter-terrorist opera-
tions; (4) hinders efforts to end an incident quickly; (5) places the lives of 
hostages and police at greater risk; and (6) spreads fear by magnifying 
terrorist violence so its impact on the public is disproportionate to actual 
harm." The media often become more than observers; they participate in 
terrorist acts by interviewing terrorists and helping them to present view-
points. 
Some have argued that self-restraint should be sufficient, because 
the media previously have demonstrated self-control: 
In the late 1970s, there was a rash of episodes in which 
spectators at sporting events jumped out onto the play-
ing field for their fifteen seconds of exposure on na-
tional television. After a number of these episodes, 
some of the networks decided to turn the cameras away. 
Instead, a reporter would say, 'There's someone run-
ning onto the field, but we won't show him to you 
because if we do, it will encourage other clowns to do 
the same thing'.20 
Although U.S. television networks agreed not to show these increasingly 
mundane events, that is different from getting hundreds of news services 
to show self-restraint when reporting a hijacking in which terrorists have 
killed a hostage. Given the desire for higher ratings or for a larger cir-
culation, some media representatives undoubtedly would choose to ig-
nore voluntary restrictions. Of course, there would be no resultant 
benefit if only some of the media showed self-restraint. 
Without self-policing, some government censorship of reporting 
would be the next logical step. However, that would be very difficult to 
achieve in virtually all of the countries concerned. Constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of the press are reasonably pervasive in Western 
states. The record so far indicates that governments are unwilling to in-
cur the political costs that might result from imposing stringent regula-
tions on media coverage. Once again, the incentive for a government to 
act alone runs into the problem of collective action. Unless all act 
together, the impact is minimal. 
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International cooperation against terrorism started with the League 
of Nations in 1934. The attempt by that organization to respond reached 
an impasse over the issue of a suitable definition of terrorism,21 and this 
problem continues to plague cooperative efforts. Many African, Asian 
and Arab states have blocked international conventions on terrorism 
brought before the U.N. General Assembly, insisting that the causes of 
terrorism must be understood before it can be eliminated. These states 
have asserted that "if undesirable acts—which some might describe as 
terrorism—are undertaken in the name of self-determination or national 
liberation, then such acts are beyond the scope of condemnation and are 
legal."22 
Western states take a different view: the end does not justify the 
means. Given U.N. inertia on the issue, these governments have started 
to cooperate through regional agreements. Yet even they have experienc-
ed serious obstacles to collective action, resulting from "incom-
patibilities of legal systems (civil law and common law), from diverging 
national interests, and from historically-based differences in political 
outlooks and cultural attitudes (for instance concerning the right of 
asylum)."23 
Effective cooperation would require that expertise, intelligence and 
technology be shared. The participants also would have to arrest, im-
prison (or extradite) known terrorists operating within their borders. 
However, because of the reasons just alluded to, these relatively 
straightforward guidelines have not always been followed. 
Stronger measures, such as political and economic sanctions against 
states which support terrorism, are even more problematic. In addition 
to differences among individual Western states, there is a systemic pro-
blem to consider. Taking effective action against international terrorism 
is a classic problem of collective action. As noted, benefits are 
distributed to the group, as a general rule, while the costs of instituting 
measures are absorbed by individual states. Thus there is an incentive to 
opt for a "free ride," that is, to have the other members of the group pay 
for the collective good while still enjoying its provision. The operation of 
this same logic is evident in the record of NATO, where suboptimal pro-
vision levels reflect (at least in part) tendencies toward "free riding."24 
Further complications await collective action against terrorism, 
because governments also may believe that privately experienced benefits 
will accrue from free riding. If Western states do act collectively, those 
which do not participate may anticipate receiving two kinds of rewards, 
public and private. The former will be represented by an overall, long-
term reduction in the level of international terrorism induced by group-
supported countermeasures. The latter set of benefits could be favored 
treatment from terrorists, who might be inclined to retaliate more (at 
least in the short-term) against the states involved in collective action. 
Individual and collective nation state roles as initiators and ag-
gressive sponsors/supporters of effective counter-terrorist action seem 
dubious. The lack of governmental resolve or ability to regulate media 
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coverage, the contention and confusion in the U.N., the legal, cultural, 
and political disparities among nations, the considerable constraints on 
wide-spread sharing of intelligence and expertise, and the problem of 
"free riding" as a disincentive to full participation in political and 
economic sanctions all point to the fact the prospects for effective action 
at the state level are not promising. It therefore becomes important to 
consider the options available to multinational corporations themselves. 
The major issues have been spotlighted and viewed from a corporate 
perspective and from an international relations perspective by 
Goldstaub: 
A global war is going on and international enterprise is 
caught in it, not as an innocent bystander but as a par-
ticipant, a silent and albeit unwilling belligerent, more 
target than combatant.25 
This insight far exceeded the prevalent conventional view of passive 
defense (for example, set barriers to physical access or structural harden-
ing) as a palative and political risk analysis as acceptable intelligence 
methodology. It assumed that MNCs would be attacked because of a 
metabolism deriving from successive hardening of symbolic 
targets—first military, then diplomatic, leaving business as the softest 
available option. This interpretation is still valid, but it is now evident 
that the business community is a preferred target because of its inherent 
attractiveness. That means the "bold steps into uncertain 
environments"26 counselled for corporate policy formulators—essential-
ly an active defense with potentially incomplete intelligence 
resources—no longer are consonant with current realities. 
Moreover, the strategic, geopolitical framework for appraising the 
role of organizational intelligence as an anti-terrorist mechanism for 
MNCs in conjunction with their nominal countries of domicile (and the 
Western alliance) presumed more cohesion than actually exists: 
Until the time comes when nation-states, as a 
geopolitical form, and multinational corporations, as a 
geoeconomic force, can afford the luxury of sorting it 
out between themselves, they had better ensure their 
survival against a common enemy.27 
The previous work is therefore not complete and requires reassessment in 
light of contemporary events and altered conditions. Anachronistic 
mindset and pure conjecture are a recipe for disaster. 
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS 
It is rather paradoxical that one of the world's largest MNCs may 
have contributed the start-up money for one of the first multinational 
terrorist networks. The Peoples' Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolu-
tionario del Pueblo - ERP), on June 12, 1974, announced that it had 
taken $5 million of the $14.2 million ransom paid by Exxon (in 142,000 
$100 bills) for Victor Samuelson, manager of the Esso oil refinery in 
Campagna, Argentina, and provided a "Junta de Coordinacion" with 
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these funds for the use of Uruguayan, Chilean and Bolivian insurgents. 
The Junta was established to direct the groups in their "joint struggle" 
across five Latin American countries.28 This transnational stage of 
development for ERP might not have been achieved without the Exxon 
"contribution." 
Multinational enterprise continues to be an eminently popular ter-
rorist target because it has developed a reputation for meeting demands 
fairly quickly; it has by definition huge resources; it is a vulnerable "soft 
target"; its very nature is generally suspect, controversial, emotionally 
charged; and, above all, it is highly symbolic. Naturally, business does 
everything it can to prevent its victimization being discovered. MNCs will 
avoid disclosure of kidnap and ransom incidents with the active coopera-
tion of many host country governments which do not want to appear as 
if they are losing control and also may have a "no ransom" policy. 
World total publicly reported kidnap ransom demands in 1986, not 
necessarily the sums that were paid, were less than $2.7 million US.29 
However, larger sums than the total reported in the year are actually paid 
in single incidents. A representative event was terminated recently. On 8 
March 1987, Richard (Rick) Paulson, a 37 year-old Canadian engineer 
employed by Occidental Petroleum as production engineer in the giant 
Canno Limon oil field along the Colombian border with Venezuela, was 
kidnapped by the National Liberation Army (ELN). 
Marxist terrorist organizations have been waging a prolonged cam-
paign against oil companies and exploration activity in that area. Two 
employees of contractors working for Occidental Petroleum were ab-
ducted by the People's Liberation Army (EPL) on 10 December 1985 and 
a ransom of several million dollars demanded. Members of the National 
Liberation Army (ELN) attacked two sections of the Occidental-Shell-
Ecopetrol pipeline near the Venezuelan border on 14 July 1986. That in-
cident was the start of a multitude of similar attacks on the pipeline dur-
ing the year. Occidental has been targeted in particular to show that 
MNCs are rapacious. In Paulson's case, public works and a $20 million 
US ransom were demanded. He was released 376 days later, on Friday, 
18 March 1988, by the Castro-inspired ELN group near the town of 
Beleen, 200 kilometers northeast of Bogata. 
The final figure reputedly paid for him was $6 million US, which is 
less than the common $10-$ 15 million US figures that were extracted dur-
ing the heyday of Argentinian and Venezuelan terrorist activity in the 
1970s. The largest reported ransom paid was $60 million US in 1975 for 
two brothers, principals of Bunge and Born, the huge grain concern. 
Some are not so lucky. Clifford Bevins of Goodyear Tire was kidnapped 
in Guatemala on 7 December 1980. He was killed by Guerrilla Army of 
the Poor on 13 August 1981. Of two engineers abducted in Colombia in 
December 1985, one was released unharmed. The body of the other, Ed-
ward Sohl of Bechtel, was discovered on 11 August 1986. He is thought 
to have died the previous May in captivity. 
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State Department records indicate a rise from 40 kidnappings in 
1983 to 53 in 1987. (An aberrative high in their figures of 87 was reported 
in 1985.) BRI sets the 1987 total at 73. There is little evidence to sustain 
the view that a company's executives may be targeted because it has kid-
nap insurance. Kidnappers are concerned with such issues as company 
size and political significance. They have little worry about companies 
having sufficient funds to meet the ransom demands.30 
Multinational companies will budget what they can to harden struc-
turally housing facilities, to train their expatriate executives in defensive 
driving techniques, to buy them bullet-proof clothing, armor their cars, 
and pay for all sorts of deterrents to maintain their presence overseas. 
They can do much less about a psychological chilling effect that has 
resulted in the no longer effusive self-esteem of expatriate personnel and 
an erosion of confidence that they will be afforded total protection at the 
geographic periphery of the organization.31 Increasingly stringent securi-
ty measures are required for corporate executives, and common com-
mentary of CEOs relates to their fall from grace, or at least from 
gracious living, to the erratic and deceptive movements of the perennial 
fugitive.32 
It is easy to see how the average, major MNC bill of half-a-million 
dollars per year for ransom insurance will continue to rise. If terrorist in-
cidents do come to light, they are denied. If they cannot be denied, they 
are minimized. Although there is no projective validity to the available 
figures from any source, kidnapping, as noted, has increased by 
everyone's count. One more trend is apparently being established: the at-
tacks against business persons and facilities overseas, as well as non-
business targets, are becoming more punitive and they involve more in-
discriminate, nihilistic methods. Higher levels of deaths and injuries have 
resulted. 
Violence against physical facilities has taken place from immediate 
and stand-off positions. In order to blow things up—and that is a fairly 
low-risk, favored ploy of terrorists—you have to get reasonably close to 
them. The exception is the use of stand-off weapons which, for the most 
part, have limited range (such as field mortars or even the newer genera-
tion of shoulder-fired, rocket-propelled grenades or anti-tank ordnance). 
Physical damage inflicted on business and non-business facilities by ter-
rorists until now has been done with conventional weaponry. The level of 
sophistication is rising rapidly,33 as exemplified by the European exploits 
of the Communist Combatant Cells, Direct Action, and the Red Army 
Faction. Whether ad hoc marriage of convenience or true ideological 
bond, the joining of Direct Action (France) and the Red Army Faction 
(West Germany) portends a potential pattern of greater potency and 
destructive impact. They declared in coming together: 
Attacks on NATO's multinational structures, on its 
bases, its strategists, its plans and propaganda, were the 
first major mobilization with a view to the formation of 
the proletarian political strategy in West Europe . . ..34 
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Losses from damage to facilities are understated if they become 
public knowledge. In cases where the costs are too large to conceal, 
claimed losses to insurance companies are overstated (read, monumen-
tal). Not exposing insurance information is just common business sense. 
Lloyds has insured a very broad spectrum of risks and has done so for 
quite a long time. INA, in 1982-83, began advertizing its coverage of 
political risks aggressively. Alexander and Alexander does so more 
directly and with less fanfare. The total number of organizations insur-
ing various aspects of political risk, loosely defined, is not known. The 
number, size, and identities of their clients are not generally known 
either. In fact, there is no comprehensive information about any of these 
factors. Private sector insurance companies intentionally keep confiden-
tial the type of insurance written and the financial volume because inter-
national business intelligence analysts have a very strong intuitive grasp 
of potential or at least possible events. They can deduce from the ag-
gregate figures, if they were freely available, what the big players are 
afraid of and where. It may take very little in an organization with a 
tense atmosphere to produce anything from extreme reluctance to make 
entry decisions to a frenzy to find the nearest exit. 
In 1986, publicly reported damage for the top five terrorist venues 
was $9,463,000 US (Colombia); $7,221,000 US (Nicaragua); $5,660,000 
US (Peru); $5,210,000 (Chile); and $3,456,000 US (El Salvador). 
However, indirect damages resulting from terrorist activities represented 
by revenues lost, for example, the export of raw materials or semi-
finished products, are substantially higher and can only be roughly 
estimated. For Colombia, the top terrorism country that year, in-country 
indirect loss stemming from terrorist bombing in pipelines and pumping 
facilities diminished petroleum revenues by over $10,000,000 US, as 
estimated by the Colombian Energy Ministry.35 As a comparative ben-
chmark, global total known property damage for 1986 attributable to 
terrorist groups did not quite reach $36 million US.36 The average of all 
this erratic action on an annual basis is highly misleading, but it is ob-
vious that whether government-sponsored or private sector insurance 
organizations provide some relief through "risk-reduction" 
instruments,37 the growing risks themselves will not be dissipated. 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACT 
Risk perceptions and economic incentives work in opposite direc-
tions. Indeed, perceptions of risk held by top-level corporate leaders pro-
bably influence decisions more than even the risks themselves, where 
they can be objectively evaluated. 
The tactical objective of terrorists is to violate, by their various ac-
tivities, the two basic components of MNC operating regimen: (1) not to 
be forced into a position of unprofitability, and (2) not be to forced into 
assessing other potential direct investment opportunities in another 
country (or countries) as a more attractive, politico-economic option. In 
the same way that terrorism is not a "vocational hazard" of interna-
tional business, it is not a "cost of doing business." Ransom payments 
can dissipate previous, hard-won, country subsidiary profits. Property 
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destruction and attendant losses are not absorbable in many cases. The 
security costs of multinational firms may double, triple or quadruple in a 
brief period because of escalating and at times exponentially rising ex-
penditures for new, highly sophisticated equipment, expanded physical 
security and protective forces, development of systems and procedures, 
and contract consultative services. 
The fear of terrorist attack and corporate expenditures for internal 
defense, as well as external services, has not as yet generally extended to 
the area of crisis management. This may in part mirror the business men-
tality: "Time means money!" Precipitously taking top-level decision 
makers away from their normal responsibilities is highly disruptive of the 
regularity which business craves and it is very costly. In the same way, 
many firms view expenditures and time dedicated to corporate in-
telligence capability as not sufficiently compensated for by potential 
results. This may also be said of preparations designed to increase 
physical security. Nevertheless, the security industry currently accounts 
for approximately $25-530 billion US of annual expenditure. Estimates 
are that by the early 1990s, the figure may be close to $60 billion US. A 
broad array of goods and services is included, from electronic 
surveillance countermeasures equipment to defensive driving training.38 
The instinct of a new security administrator with a law-enforcement 
background when a significant physical attack occurs might be to resort 
to reactive protective measures. He or she soon learns to perceive situa-
tions within the business frame of reference:39 what is the probable extent 
of damage to be absorbed without protective preparations; what will the 
preparations cost; which is less and what will insurance cost? Many cor-
porations are still inclined to "take the hit" if it may be less expensive 
financially. The disruption to organizational continuity and the substan-
tial trauma engendered throughout the organization by a major incident 
has, however, led more and more firms to consider corporate head-
quarters and local, site-specific crisis management teams as essential.40 
Administrative overhead also goes with this organizational growth. 
Above and beyond the structural attributes, MNCs have had to cope 
with salary negotiations which reflect the peculiar and special hardships 
of various posts. Assignments are likely to be shorter as transfer from 
hardship posts becomes normative, with consequent high costs for the 
firm. An additional, and major, consideration is that of diminished ex-
ecutive productivity under conditions of psychological stress and re-
quired security constraints—a "hidden" but very real cost. 
Both strategic corporate investment planning and situational deci-
sion making clearly have had to comprehend terrorism as a material risk 
factor in the calculation of potential losses and increased costs which 
may result from a postulated range of gradients in the terrorist threat 
(ergo, the concepts of asset protection and risk management). Physical 
security has now become a preeminent concern of MNCs. The agenda 
has been reset. Consequently, the organizational intelligence structures 
of some global enterprises have been considerably revamped so that 
security-oriented intelligence activity has emerged as a principal force. 
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Acquisition, evaluation, and acceptance of other information that is 
really important to long-range planning may have begun to atrophy in 
comparison. 
Moreover, business requires the semblance of continuity, stability, 
and calculations which are both rational and delicate, while "terrorism 
projects mostly destabilization, discontinuity and extreme emotions."41 
Terrorist intent is to produce a pervasive sense of disorientation and 
destabilization of the operating environment so that there will no longer 
be an expectation of getting up in the morning and going about 
"business as usual" because disruption will become normative. Hence, 
policy formulation will be engaged in within the constraints of "fuzzy 
gambling."42 
PRA AND ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE43 
Until approximately five years ago, political risk assessment (PRA) 
was a household word in international corporations. This is no longer the 
case, although the fraternity continues its pursuit of technical excellence 
as a substitute for realistic appraisal. Part of the mythology created at 
the zenith of PRA was that the tools of logic and rationality so 
sacrosanct in business, economic and academic cultures (the philosophy 
of knowledge) could be adequately focused on political risk and it thus 
could be "managed."44 
However, events have proven recurrently that logic is culture-bound 
and terrorism as a culture has a rationality which is diametrically oppos-
ed to that of Western industrial civilization, although terrorists in-
dividually and collectively are quite capable of using its technological ac-
couterments. Hence, terrorism as a tactical weapon has the advantage 
over large-scale conventional warfare of being used in a manner which 
maximizes the crucial element of surprise—especially time surprise—as a 
concomitant of its inherent unpredictability and abrupt changes in 
methods and targets. Given that the intrinsic rationality of terrorism is 
alien ("crazy") to social sciences practitioners who advise most business 
and government hierarchies, terrorists are therefore provided with a fur-
ther conceptual advantage. 
PRA has both a structural tunnel vision, that is, country risk, and a 
fascination with technique which make it as vulnerable as the system it 
was meant to serve. Business, with its functional orientation, remains 
convinced that inducing a political scientist to engage in periodic specula-
tion will provide sufficient intelligence for staff to run models of poten-
tial impact on the proverbial bottom line of marketing, finance, etc. 
Hard realities dictate that MNCs must think and operate as inherently 
geo-political entities as well as geo-economic ones within an interactive 
world system. In sum, nationhood is not the fundamental determinant of 
status or the capacity to influence outcomes. That capability hinges on 
information, which is the real power of organizations, indeed, of any 
organism, almost regardless of size. 
The largest MNCs do have intelligence services, which certainly can-
not be called "little CIAs." They have had them for some time, and are 
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not in the immediate process of creating them. However, there are people 
(some of whom had formerly been in government service) who offer ser-
vices such as teaching MNCs how to evolve their own intelligence 
systems. Such systems are not an off-the-shelf item in the way PRA used 
to be and, in large measure, still is. Previously and presently, an advisory 
service may provide risk analysis on sixty countries and it does not matter 
whether the firm is in pharmaceuticals or resource extraction. If they 
pick Mexico, they receive a standard product and what they make of it is 
their problem.45 
The political risk analysis that was practiced in the main had ac-
complished little more than to unnecessarily constrain the type of in-
tuitive grasp that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) had of their operating 
environments and projected an image of omnipotence on the part of 
political risk analysts and a specious sense of control. PRA is inclined 
toward computer treatments and exercises such as Bayesian analysis and 
modified Delphi technique. Those involved in the activity became so 
good at these conceptual games in the early days that the intelligence 
community would approach some of the consulting firms doing political 
risk analysis for major corporations and the corporations that had built 
in-house capacity to see if they could derive anything out of it.46 There 
has been a perceptible shift over the past five to seven years, so that it is 
now the government which has superior techniques for treating in-
telligence of this nature and by far a more extensive and integrated net-
work for dedicated collection. 
In addition, the institutionalization of internal capacity for political 
risk analysis in international corporate structures often took the form of 
hiring a new Ph.D. in political science and parachuting him or her into 
an old-line corporate international economics division, at which time he 
or she was promptly frozen out of the flow of information and isolated 
from the process of high-level decision influencing, thus aborting the 
original intent. Nevertheless, from being a corporate fad earlier, PRA 
grew wildly because of the traumatic fall of the Shah in Iran. 
Iran was a disaster from the point of view of Western Alliance 
defense policy, it was a disaster from the point of view of strategic 
posture, and it was a disaster so far as international business was con-
cerned. It was so much of a "surprise"47 that even a Swiss financial 
organization which is reputed to have the best commercial intelligence 
service in the world was caught off guard. Their intelligence unit is not 
modeled on a strategic/geopolitical service like the CIA,48 but their 
validation of information is much the same. They check the information 
against other information they are receiving and they assign a measure 
(uncomplicated, running the gamut of just three levels or categories) to 
the reliability and credibility of the source. Had they received informa-
tion from that source before? Had the previous information been 
reliable? What about the validity of the information currently being pro-
vided? Fortunately, they do not generate the same kind of end product 
that many PRA producers did and still do.4 ' 
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Political risk analysis was excessively concerned at one time with the 
possibilities or probabilities of an impending change in host country 
government—that was considered a linchpin. If the government was in 
danger of changing, that was bad. If the incumbent regime stayed on, 
that was good. We now know that it does not matter whether govern-
ments change or not. For instance, American multinational corporations 
continue doing business with the Marxian-oriented governments of 
Angola50 and other similar regimes which, for the sake of general con-
sumption at any rate, the U.S. government finds reprehensible, morally 
repugnant, and an affront to American ideology. 
Business has no ideology except survival and profit, as distinct from 
the ideological biases of its top management as individuals. Viability is a 
preeminent concern. Since the organization needs information from its 
environment so that it can remain a potent force, business will get that 
information in any way it can. If it collects information from open 
sources, that is all right. If intelligence collection is from individuals, 
groups, or organizations as primary or secondary sources, the manner of 
access and the MNC's home country become very important considera-
tions." 
The global corporations with well-institutionalized intelligence ser-
vices have teams that go out and collect information. However, that is 
not always or not even usually the case. Ideally, everyone who is out at 
the periphery and those at the headquarters who make visits overseas are 
part of the intelligence apparatus of an MNC. They have to be. The peo-
ple who are line operating personnel, from corporate headquarters out to 
the periphery, are invariably more knowledgeable than the internal staff 
at the center, where purportedly the thinking is going on. Although many 
companies have not recognized the value of it, the debriefing process, 
when people come back from overseas assignment, is more valuable for 
the intelligence that can be extracted from it than as a mechanism for 
mitigating the trauma of reentry by the executive and his family to home 
country environment after a long period abroad. This is finally being 
realized. 
Both corporate and strategic geopolitical intelligence employ many 
of the same kinds of procedures, although the technical intelligence 
(techint) capacity of the national intelligence establishment is staggering. 
There are, to begin with, open information sources being utilized. People 
do environmental scanning from available data and literature and also 
talk to reporters, bankers, businessmen with whom they maintain con-
tact, and a broad array of people whom the firm does not pay—all of 
which is permissible. In addition, favours are done on a reciprocal basis. 
Other people know things as well and information is traded and exchang-
ed between and among individual intelligence officers. It is being ac-
complished on an informal basis and has traditionally been done that 
way. With the levels of risk presently being encountered, however, it is 
evolving in a more formalized way.52 
Contracting out for information is expensive. The fees are very 
high, depending in some cases on how prestigeous the individual who 
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may be the supplier of concentrated intelligence or infallible judgments 
had been in former public life. Even in the cases of firms regularly sup-
plying country analysis, the fees may range from a quick overview for 
$9,500 to a yearly report, with or without supplements, at $50,000. As a 
consequence of the costs, as well as growing self-confidence, many 
smaller firms prefer to secure critical information from government and 
other private sector sources and use their own judgment, based on 
longitudinal experience in a particular country or area, as to what the 
potential of the impending situation means for their specific operations. 
The management decision in many corporations to forego develop-
ment of in-house capacity, or to accept or reject expensive external infor-
mation inputs which do not totally accord with idiosyncratic organiza-
tional characteristics, may be made on the basis of considerations other 
than the magnitude of the direct cost itself. The potential costs of having 
a proprietary intelligence system, even of the PRA genre, are weighed 
against the perceived costs of large-scale organizational development and 
many corporations have opted for the acqusition of externally-generated 
policy inputs. The deciding factors are not necessarily the size of the fees 
but anxiety over expected disruption of the organizational structure and 
the concomitant opportunity costs of preempted top-level management 
time in the organizational development process ( = $). These may be false 
economies in the longer run because the decision process also conditions 
perceptions of the necessity for development of a crisis management 
team or teams. 
An alteration has taken place over the past decade in organizational 
priorities relating to information gathering at the corporate periphery, 
the amalgamation of this information with other internal and external 
resources, and the submission to top management of risk or threat 
assessment profiles. The thrust has lately been on physical and personnel 
security-related information. The concern over other relatively conven-
tional economic issues such as foreign exchange exposure, repatriation of 
profits, expropriation, etc., that PRA had been apprehensive about 
previously, has significantly dissipated. Amelioration of these exposures 
with commercially available risk-reduction instruments has been 
rendered routine procedure, and, as a result, there has been a decline in 
multinational corporations of the PRA emphasis on central analytical 
staff (the paralysis of analysis).53 More direct human collection of infor-
mation is now emphasized. 
Of necessity, as do governments, the organization will acquire infor-
mation from: foreign government officials; professors, both domestic 
and foreign;54 perennial host country graduate students, especially in the 
law schools, and their expatriate counterparts; journalists; and members 
of identifiable dissident elements within any given society in which it 
operates. In some cases, it is critical to determine what they are doing or 
to attempt to make contact with them at the risk of alienating the incum-
bent authorities. Intelligence is accumulated through "service sector" 
workers such as maitre d's, bell hops, waiters, taxi drivers, travel agents, 
airport baggage handlers, doctors, politicians, security forces personnel, 
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judges, lawyers, accountants, bankers—in short, from anyone and in 
anyway it can be gotten. A multinational corporation is not a moral 
paragon, and it does not have to posture the way governments invariably 
posture. Its basic raison d'etre is to survive, and even to prosper, which is 
why it distrusts governments. It distrusts all governments, even that of its 
home country. 
PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE 
In order to "destroy capitalist imperialism," terrorists and states 
that employ terrorism see this activity as a legal and morally acceptable 
instrument of policy. It must be used to disrupt and ultimately destroy 
the global market system and the enterprises which are instrinsic to its 
vitality and viability. Of course, from an ideological perspective, Marx-
ism views capitalism as a self-destructive economic system, especially as 
related to less-developed countries. Capitalism therefore must be seen as 
collapsing because of its internal contradictions. Put differently, the 
Soviets do not have to defend communism (it is, in practice, 
indefensible); their doctrine says that it is capitalism which must fail. 
They, and those who subscribe to that philosophy, intend to help it do 
so.55 The chaos and dissolution syndrome is accordingly a very attractive 
one ideologically. 
Thus, in addition to domestic groups or indigenous factions that 
might want to punish a host-country government, the MNC, or both, 
global corporations must assess a strategic war. It is being waged by 
forces which will aid and abet any group, any movement, which, for 
whatever reason, appears to be helpful in accomplishing their strategic 
ends: to force Western industrial countries to pull back from areas of the 
world in which they have been largely preeminent or at least extremely in-
fluential in the past. At the heart of the matter is access to world 
resources and the cohesion of the Western Alliance. Strategic materials 
are acquired, because of the predisposition in most industrial nations for 
free-enterprise capitalism or some variant thereof, through corporate 
enterprise and not in the main by direct bilateral government ar-
rangements. This places MNCs at the strategic nexus of the covert con-
flict. 
A form of withdrawal is to be seen cumulatively on the part of oil 
companies. They are, much less than before, owners of things in the 
ground. In the international arena they are becoming essentially in-
termediaries, which means that they have engaged in risk avoidance. 
Because they recognize that the oil business is neither quick nor portable 
so they have decided to provide certain services. This reduces their 
vulnerability in terms of having to possess fixed assets and resources in a 
specific high-risk area, factors they must deal with. The oil business is 
resource-based and location-specific; the product does not exist in other 
places and cannot expediently be created. Many other resource-based 
companies have recognized the same thing. In a large number of situa-
tions were manufacturing companies are affected, there are few if any 
expatriate executives in the host countries. Their operations are being run 
by host country or third country nationals. 
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Terrorist states also will initiate actions of their own—through sur-
rogates when possible—in furtherance of their objectives if and when 
they can do so with reasonably low risks and the convenience and the 
safety of vociferous disavowal. Most attacks by terrorists are carefully 
planned, researched, and executed. Such preparation is done within a 
generic and often subjective frame of reference. The act itself is not a 
spur-of-the-moment reaction to events, although immediate cir-
cumstances could well trigger a well-prepared terrorist strike. 
Hence, the ties between MNCs and the governments and armed 
forces of their home countries (especially the United States) and their 
allies may be seized upon as a legitimation for attack. Such was the case 
in: the Brussels bombings of Litton, Honeywell, Motorola and other 
NATO-related defense contractors; the killing of Gen. Rene Audran, 
Director of International Affairs, Arms Sales Division, French Defense 
Ministry, on 25 January 1985; the murder on 9 July 1986 of Dr. Karl-
Heinz Beckurts by the Red Army Faction with a remote controlled bomb 
for his role in the nuclear industry and research into the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI); the murder of French industrialist Georges 
Besse in November 1986; or the assassination on 20 March 1987 of Air 
Force Gen. Licio Georgien, who promoted an Italian role in Star Wars. 
If these connections are not used as a pretext, then something else will be 
because terrorists are embarked upon a delineable course of high-
casualty attacks against soft targets. 
This is not to suggest that terrorists have won or will win, or that 
multinational corporations are irrevocably hostage to a hostile operating 
environment which will force them from a state of siege, both physically 
and psychologically, into abject unprofitability while bankrupting in-
dustrial societies and plunging them into ruin. Nor is a Fortress Europe 
and/or North America postulated, with total havoc being wrought upon 
sophisticated and vulnerable societies by internal elements and foreign 
agents in their midst. However, the momentum of events has already 
radically distorted the global operations of both governments and MNCs 
which are potential targets, not to mention the effect that the fear of ter-
rorism has had on the public. In addition, the prospects for stable 
economic progress in the developing world have assuredly been damaged 
by the mounting violence. 
There is not an unlimited elasticity to the capacity of even the very 
richest MNCs to absorb the costs of doing business in high-risk en-
vironments and treat them as normal operating expenses. Ultimately, 
sustaining large losses from repeated ransom payments or prolonged 
payment of ransom insurance premiums and high volumes of security ex-
penditures, among other exposures, means that the amounts, in time, 
become too large to just 'write off.' Initial cost estimates for structural 
hardening and construction of new secure diplomatic installations sub-
mitted by the U.S. State Department were $3.3 billion.56 Current 
estimates amount to $4.2 billion.57 There are many MNCs with levels of 
global presence at least equal to the U.S. Government. In addition to 
physical hardening of structures, another passive defense option is 
86 
Conflict Quarterly 
making targets unattractive because attackers cannot get close enough to 
them with standoff weapons or cannot penetrate them to kill personnel 
or do extensive damage to sensitive equipment. 
Money and communications organizations—VISA, for in-
stance—have attempted to harden themselves procedurally against intru-
sion into their computer networks by restructuring the networks. They 
understand that their crucial vulnerability to being attacked is not merely 
physical but extends especially to the integrity of their networks, to the 
introduction, say, of a one-in-three margin of error in the internal logic 
for billing procedures or the ability to transfer funds internationally or 
internally. 
It is known from many incidents in Europe that terrorist groups are 
technically adroit and have attempted to intervene in communications 
and computational networks as well as attack the infrastructure. The 
Committee for the Liquidation of Deterrence of Computers (CLODC) 
viewed computers as the chosen instrument of those in power because 
they are employed to classify, control, and repress. This opinion was 
contained in a statement issued to the French press after they bombed 
Ministry of Transportation Computers. The Angry Brigade attempted to 
bomb London police computers; more than twenty computer centers 
were bombed in Italy by terrorists;58 the computer center of the West 
German firm that produces transport vehicles for Pershing II missiles 
was bombed by the Rote Zellen terrorist group; Philips Data System's 
computer in Toulouse, France, was bombed by Action Group 27-28 
March. 
By early 1985 alone, reported attacks on more than fifty computer 
facilities had occurred in the West with over 40% taking place in the 
United States.59 Once again, there are no really valid and reliable 
numbers on computer attacks or disasters because businesses and 
governments do everything they possibly can to obscure their individual 
and collective vulnerability and victimization and rightly so. 
It is estimated that of the businesses which have had a computer 
disaster, whatever the cause, between 85.6% and 93% are no longer in 
business after five years.60 Obviously, some organizations are very large 
and in order to constitute a disaster an event would also have to be quite 
large in its impact if not scale. Military computer equipment was 
destroyed at the Sperry plant in Eagan, Michigan, by saboteurs; a person 
or persons unknown erased 27 computer tapes at a plant in Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, which belonged to the Y-12 nuclear weapons parts operation; 
the IBM offices in Harriman, New York, were bombed by the United 
Freedom Front. For smaller operations, such as the First Data Corpora-
tion of Waltham, Massachusetts, the suspicious fire at its computer 
center, which forced it to withdraw service for a week to 500 time-sharing 
clients, hurt badly. 
Intrusion into computer networks has become chronic, though in 
many instances more as a result of weaknesses in the security system than 
the criminality, predilection for gratuitous mayhem, or political malice 
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of the hackers. Targets run the gamut from major universities to 
publishing houses to the military.61 The recent NASA incident points up 
the vulnerability of critical networks to high-tech terrorism.62 
INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION 
Terrorist tactics range from the use of destructive brute force to 
highly sophisticated disruption, with the attendant potential for future 
evolution of actions against larger social aggregates. This is implied by 
the availability of weapons, methods and techniques which may be 
developing at a faster pace than governments or corporations can 
develop and emplace countermeasures. There is every incentive to "out-
invent' ' terrorists because a reactive anti-terrorist posture still leaves the 
initiative in the hands of terrorists and terrorist states. They will use it. 
They are dedicated to attack and will not desist. Low-intensity, un-
conventional, covert conflict has high yields for them. In the same way 
that terrorists wage a war of nerves, of symbolism and psychology, of at-
trition and forced options, they should be granted no quarter and no 
respite. A proactive counter-terrorist attitude mandates that pressure 
should be relentless and increasing. Costs in dollars and lives are going to 
be high, but more likely lower in the long-run with seizure of the in-
itiative. 
The multi-faceted campaign to be pursued by nation states encom-
passes a variety of economic instruments and diplomatic/political levers. 
It should also include the possibility of paramilitary as well as military 
operations. This last option must be judiciously employed. However, for 
reasons explored in the earlier part of the article, truly concerted action 
on the part of nation states will probably remain at a suboptimal level. It 
should be pointed out that while cooperation between and among coun-
tries, their law enforcement and intelligence agencies, proceeds apace, so 
does cooperation between and among terrorist organizations. They are 
well into the most productive segment of their learning curve, and there 
is no scarcity of professional terrorist pedagogues. 
The corporate community is well aware of its vulnerability in this 
environment. They are quite perceptibly making haste to respond. The 
current pervasive need for both corporate anti- and counter-terrorist in-
telligence points up the fact that there is no singular solution offering 
protection for MNCs, and the most frustrating aspect of the situation is 
that for some time, as a top security chief put it, they have not been able 
to "subscribe to a single, accurate, reliable public or private source of 
constant and routine information to warn" them.63 Global enterprises 
are not at all passive, but the costs of being discovered at aggressive ac-
tion relating to terrorism are far greater than for a company being caught 
attempting to acquire some proprietary technological secrets. 
Should multinational corporations use direct tactics (rather than a 
government doing so), they would find themselves persona non grata in 
most countries in the world—at least in the Third World. Corporations, 
under international law, do not have the status or prerogatives of a na-
tion state. Diplomatic representatives are protected persons; corporate 
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executives are not. Under certain circumstances, nations may use 
unilateral force to gain redress or even preempt the actions of another; 
corporations may not legally do so. The corporation and the CEO might 
also be subject to prosecution in its home country. It is not that the 
capacity to act does not exist, nor, for that matter, that the will to act 
does not exist. They can hire expertise if they do not want to act 
themselves, but they are not foolish. It is the ultimate stake which must 
be assessed. They understand the risks, and those risks, unless it is a life 
or death situation for the corporation, are simply too large under the 
contemporary international legal regimen. 
The precarious position of corporate entities in the world system is a 
direct function of the fact that nation states are still the principal 
elements of an international framework. Nation states have arrogated 
power to themselves in the same way that kings and other players in the 
feudal system pre-dating the evolution of an international system did. 
They have also decided that the rules of the game (laws) are to apply so as 
to maintain their position and privilege, which they construe as a right, in 
the same way as kings had legitimized and enforced their status. It is 
more possible to believe in the divine right of nations that it is possible to 
believe in the divine right of kings. But it is possible, indeed, realistically 
necessary, to believe in power. Power has its privileges, usually con-
strained somewhat by territoriality. However, it is the system which 
defines legality, morality and ethics, and not necessarily in a purely ra-
tional or equitable manner. 
Non-state actors such as organized religion, from the Roman 
Catholic to the Unification churches, have a corporate structure, as do 
other non-state entities. The PLO has a reputed treasury (the Palestine 
National Fund) of over $5 billion US, invests in Western Europe and the 
U.S. through "shell" companies in Luxembourg and Lichtenstein, 
'washes' Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti petrodollars through accounts in 
Switzerland, West Germany and Latin America, and amasses its wealth 
by some fair means and some very foul ones indeed. Its revenues pay for 
administration, purchase of supplies, social services and retirement 
benefits.M International labour unions have similar concerns—outside of 
fielding paramilitary forces and purchasing sophisticated arms—even in 
the bad old days of the Teamsters' and Longshoremen's unions. 
The head of the PLO, however, can stride into the United Nations 
General Assembly with a loaded sidearm, declare his, and his organiza-
tion's, intention to use lethal armed force in pursuit of their objectives 
and be greeted by thunderous ovation and the conferral of tacit legality 
for such acts. No labour leader, church leader, or corporate CEO would 
be treated thusly, overtly or covertly. It would be an occasion for shock, 
dismay, consternation, and vilification, not jubilation and adoration. 
Those fixated on the nation state, therefore, are bound to see MNCs 
as non-state actors having only privileges accorded at the discretion of 
the principal players in the international system and not as forces in a 
world system with objectives whose legitimacy nation states need not 
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ratify because they are effective anyway. They are bound to ask: "Who 
gave them the right to defend themselves?" The answer must perforce be 
that MNCs have as much a natural right to self-defense, including 
preemption, as nations who created themselves and a self-serving system. 
There is also a perception that seizure of the initiative, that is, a pro-
active posture, must be defined as if it were a sovereign prerogative. Both 
for national governments and for multinational corporations, proactive 
counter-terrorism does not mean the use of armed and/or lethal force. 
That view and the imposed definition which supports it are formal, ar-
bitrary and incorrect. Semantic arguments as to what constitutes passive 
or active defense and reactive or proactive measures are sterile and 
counterproductive exercises. There is no desire or intent to engage in 
such activity here or anywhere else. However, operational examples are 
appropriate and in order. 
The emplacement of fixed warning or physical restraint devices, 
such as chain link fences, vehicular barriers, alarm systems and similar 
devices are passive defenses, which, like structural hardening of 
facilities, may not necessarily require or even have human monitoring as 
a complement. Active defense includes: K-9 presence; mobile human 
monitoring of site perimeters by vehicular or foot patrol; the installation 
and operation of electronic surveillance countermeasures, personal iden-
tification security systems, and physical computer security defenses, such 
as restricted access to sensitive areas. In the event there is the potential 
for sophisticated attack and a considerable level of technical expertise 
has been demonstrated by terrorists or others, internal and external com-
putational/communications interfaces (critical nodes) protection which 
seeks to defend the integrity of systems logic would be considered an ac-
tive defense. 
Many defense mechanisms, such as pre-departure briefing, would 
also be viewed as reactive in a practical setting and the situational 
response, in the specific locale and under the prevailing corporate securi-
ty conditions, would define how it might be construed. Some industries 
and economic sectors—for example, oil or resource exploration and ex-
traction—have vulnerabilities which are recurrent and global, given their 
particular activity; other corporation are faced with more site-specific 
threats. Assuming relatively little previous coverage, the hiring of a host 
country security force or contracting with domestic security force com-
panies, a booming business in many high-risk countries, would be reac-
tive in the face of threat advisories, as would requests for coverage from 
local host country police. These may also be construed as active defense. 
More patently reactive postures are withdrawal of expatriate 
managers and staff, closure of operations, the institution of crisis 
management teams (also, in some contexts, active defense) for the coun-
try operation, the area, division, or corporate-wide. The initiation or ex-
pansion of cooperation with the host country government security ap-
paratus could likewise be perceived as either active defense or reactive, 
depending upon whether it was generated by preventive concern or 
prompted by an actual incident. The offer of rewards for information 
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resulting in the capture and conviction of terrorists, linked in some way 
to their ransom demands, would be reactive or perhaps proactive. 
Proactive options include, but are not limited to: 
— Recruitment and maintenance of cadres of expert advisors and 
trainers skilled in the political and security aspects of unconventional 
conflict; 
— Training of in-house special operations (counter-terrorism) 
forces, when permissible by the host country; 
— A policy, in high-risk venues, of misinformation, disinformation 
and deception;65 
— Psychological warfare campaigns against terrorist elements, ex-
pecially when host country penetration of a group can be achieved after 
surveillance, or "turning" of an apprehended member, or enlistment of 
an authentic, willing defector; 
— Intervention and interference with terrorist group infrastructure, 
communications and intelligence flow, where and when they can be iden-
tified; 
— Payment of gratuities for information and assistance from 
various host country sources, which in many countries is the only way to 
get anything done, even of a pedestrian nature. 
It must be stated here in the strongest terms that these and other 
measures are not being counselled per se. Nevertheless, realistically they 
are or can be employed and, except for the aberrant recourse to 
paramilitary forces or assassination, governments and other non-state 
entities utilize these options as part of an available spectrum of measures. 
Low-intensity warfare does not mean that armed or lethal force is a man-
datory element or that it is the only alternative for counter-terrorism. 
One of the most potentially effective mechanisms, in fact, is a non-
violent one: propaganda, which is not a dirty word, and use of the 
media. 
"Terrorist groups have shown great skill in dealing with the media" 
and their outrages are "likely to attract considerable press and television 
attention,"66 regardless of what any government does. However, MNCs 
in host country settings have a prototype model to examine which should 
have been better used for longitudinal proactive effect instead of having 
been an exemplar of reactive posture. A brief summary of that event is 
instructive. The Argimiro Gabaldon Revolutionary Command presented 
documents to the Venezuelan press following the kidnapping in February 
1976 of the Owens-Illinois subsidiary President, William Niehous.67 
They made it mandatory, as part of their many demands, that a 
manifesto be issued by the company as one of the basic conditions for his 
release. The Venezuelan Government blacked out domestic media 
coverage but the firm complied and on 6 April 1976 a half-page pro-
clamation, "To the People of Venezuela" was published in the New 
York Times (p. 59, col. 1), The Times (London) and Le Monde. 
The purported "proofs" presented to the domestic media of ter-
rorist allegations that Owens-Illinois was guilty of political interference 
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and economic administrative meddling involving acts of bribery and 
embezzlement were really rather mundane and not very incriminating at 
all. In fact, of the 22 photographs of company telexes, memorandums 
and business reports, some had been unsophisticatedly falsified. The ter-
rorists' use of the media was countered by Owens-Illinois and the 
Niehous family. El National (Venezuela) printed five pieces in 1976 air-
ing their views: 13 March, p. D16; 17 March, pp. 14-16; 25 March, p. 
D20; 30 March, pp. D13 and D16; and 7 April, p. Al . The seizure of the 
initiative was designed to undercut the terrorists' position and public im-
age. 
If only a portion of the monies MNCs paid since then in ransom and 
security-related expenditures had been spent on continuing radio and 
television campaigns (far more effective than newspapers in host coun-
tries with low literacy levels), to undermine the appeal, the legitimacy, 
veracity and validity of terrorist claims and allegations, there is reason to 
believe that terrorists' play to public support and the vindication of their 
acts by the invariable projection of a 'Robin Hood' image would be ap-
preciably weaker. Rather than deny them publicity as a means of depriv-
ing terrorists of their visibility, recognition, and implied legitimacy, even 
respectability, it may well be more appropriate to turn the tables on them 
and give them all the bad publicity they deserve, cumulatively building a 
sense of mass repugnance for their brutality, amorality, cynicism, 
hypocrisy and implacable hatred. 
Proactive options of an unarmed, non-lethal nature do exist for 
governments and corporations, but they will not instantaneously and 
conveniently destroy terrorism nor many terrorist groups. Hence, the 
battle with terrorism will be a fact of life, and death, for some time into 
the future. It is, and will be, a source of constant concern to those na-
tions who prize freedom and refuse to acquiesce to political gangsterism. 
It is, and will be, a continuing threat to the operations of international 
business. The initial issue, therefore, is the primary requirement for an 
adequate corporate intelligence function for their tactical defense and for 
policy formulation and strategic planning purposes in a global geo-
political context. There is a further need for proactive counter-terrorist 
assets, informational and operational. 
As the present mode of the international institutions would have it, 
and in recognition of the at times convoluted and questionable legal, 
moral and ethical dissonances involving nations and non-state actors, the 
risks of engaging in some types of activities are obviously substantial. 
However, risks are what business is used to and the possibility of 
catastrophic events, as well as their prevention or mitigation, are what 
geopolitics are all about. Passive as well as active anti- and counter-
terrorism options must be explored because the opposition is playing for 
keeps; this is not a computer simulation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A research agenda on terrorism and MNCs should establish clearly 
the geopolitical context of multinational corporate activities, the nature 
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of MNCs as non-state actors in global affairs and the commensurate 
status of terrorism as a non-state and/or state activity, with both 
dynamics having interactive tactical and strategic properties. Exploring a 
broad range of potential proactive options could result in additional 
operational tools for corporations dealing with a high-risk global en-
vironment and induce as well substantial revision of organizational self-
image and corporate planning and policy practices. Strategic and in-
telligence considerations more appropriate to the practical essence of 
MNCs would be duly recognized as a consequence. 
The development of a conceptual framework comprehending the 
dynamics of MNC/geopolitical interaction and examination of its policy 
implications should be conducted as part of an ongoing consultative pro-
cess with an extensive range of academically-based as well as operational 
sources in the linked fields of specialization. However, there is no body 
of literature to provide policy guidance on the interactive linkage of 
intelligence-terrorism-covert conflict-global corporate operations-
security studies because the articulated concept has not been advanced 
before. What currently exists is a spectrum of compartmentalized 
literatures, some large, some small, with, in most cases, little attempt to 
relate concerns which are operationally as well as conceptually entwined 
in the real world. 
The scientific method and academic discipline are highly distortive 
mechanisms. This derives in major part from the extremely strong 
cultural proclivity, conditioned as Western industrial societies are to the 
philosophy of knowledge, to set up artificial boundaries in the way that 
information is classified, coded, and stored. This tendency also modifies 
and constrains perception and learning processes. Because Western 
societies are not prepared to accept a philosophy of action as "frame-of-
appreciation,"68 they reject terrorist perspectives as logically alien and ir-
rational, a mistake that can be fatal. An important priority of subse-
quent work, therefore, should be a baseline bibliography that provides 
the means for addressing resources in an operationally interrelated way 
rather than according to currently favoured conventional, compartmen-
talized frames-of-reference. This will facilitate the rigorous evaluation of 
policy in the new era of active posture by MNCs towards global ter-
rorism. 
International relations specialists still have not been willing to come 
to terms with the realities of MNCs as non-state actors on the global 
stage whose objectives and behaviour are every bit as significant as that 
of nation states. As a result, their analysis proceeds along traditional 
lines of defining "national interests" as the basic dynamic of global in-
teraction. The first priority is to acknowledge that international business 
is not a little like war, it is war, and thereby makes global enterprise 
vulnerable to all the risks of geopolitical conflict and paramilitary 
engagement faced by nation states, without the prerogative for the 
forceful means of conflict resolution available to national entities.69 Until 
there is greater formal recognition of the role non-state actors play in the 
global system, and a corresponding accommodation by nation states to 
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this power, the world legal framework will not appreciably alter. Its ap-
parent and growing perversities will remain characteristic of an increas-
ingly anachronistic system. For a time, at any rate, intermediation by 
global corporations in their operating environment will be through the 
mechanisms of business diplomacy and risk assessment intelligence, 
geared to specific organizational needs. 
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